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Individuals are willing to sacrifice their own resources to promote
equality in groups. These costly choices promote equality and are
associated with behavior that supports cooperation in humans,
but little is known about the brain processes involved. We use
functional MRI to study egalitarian preferences based on behavior
observed in the “random income game.” In this game, subjects de-
cide whether to pay a cost to alter group members’ randomly allo-
cated incomes.We specifically examinewhether egalitarian behavior
is associated with neural activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex and the insular cortex, two regions that have been shown to be
related to social preferences. Consistent with previous studies, we
find significant activation in both regions; however, only the insular
cortex activations are significantly associated with measures of
revealed and expressed egalitarian preferences elicited outside the
scanner. These results are consistentwith thenotion that brainmech-
anisms involved in experiencing the emotional states of others
underlie egalitarian behavior in humans.
behavioral economics | egalitarianism
An intriguing aspect of human behavior that has long puzzledscholars (1) is that individuals are willing to sacrifice their
own resources to promote equality in groups. For example, when
dividing resources between oneself and others, people make fair
divisions, at a cost to themselves, when the interaction is anony-
mous and the opportunity for reciprocity does not exist (2).
Individuals reject unequal divisions offered by others, even if
rejection means neither party receives anything (3); they reject
payment for a task after having observed another receiving
a higher payment for the same task, even when they had accepted
the lower payment before observing others’ payoffs (4); and they
voluntarily pay a personal cost to increase the resources of the
poorest members of their groups and decrease the resources of
the richest members, even when no reputational benefits or rec-
iprocity can be expected (5).
Recent neuroscience studies using functionalMRI (fMRI) have
begun to identify the neural mechanisms underlying other-ori-
ented behavior. For example, reward-related mechanisms play an
important role when individuals engage in costly punishment of
people who choose not to contribute to a mutual effort (6), during
both mandatory and volitional giving to others (7), and when
contemplatingmore equal divisions of resources (8). However, the
focus of these experiments has been on dyadic instead of group
interactions. Moreover, although these studies identify brain areas
active during valuation, they do not identify which activations can
be used to predict which individuals will actually engage in egali-
tarian behavior outside of a scanner.
To better understand what neural mechanisms might underlie
egalitarian behavior in groups, we use a procedure called the
“random-income” game. In this game, participants in a group are
arbitrarily assigned a level of income and the group is assigned to
one of three specific levels of income distribution by a computer
(see SI Methods). Past analyses of the random-income game have
shown that participants are willing to pay to take from the rich and
to give to the poor, even in circumstances where the participants
have no control of their initial income level and the group’s initial
income distribution. This willingness to pay is driven in part by
emotional responses to unequal outcomes (5). Importantly, those
with the greatest sensitivity to inequality in the random-income
game are also those most likely to engage in costly punishment of
noncontributors in a separate public-goods game (9), a behavior
that has been shown to promote cooperation in humans (10).
We conducted an fMRI experiment on 20 subjects (10 male, 10
female) to identify brain regions involved in different stages of a
random-income game paradigm (Fig. 1). In this experiment, each
scanned subject was placed in a group with three subjects outside
the scanner in each round, and all subjects made decisions in 20
rounds, giving each scanner subject 60 opportunities to decide
whether to send positive or negative tokens to group members of
different incomes. Consistent with other studies conducted outside
the scanner (5), the behavioral results show that participants were
increasingly willing to pay to take money from those with the
highest incomes and to givemoney to those with the lowest (Fig. 1).
Results
Based on results of other studies involving social inequality (11,
12), we focused on activations within the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), which includes the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(13). Consistent with this earlier work (8), we find that activation
in this area is associated with decision-making in the random-
income game. However, we did not find a significant relationship
between activation and measures of expressed and revealed
egalitarian preferences elicited outside the scanner (Fig. 2).
In addition to the vmPFC, we focused on the insular cortex as a
region of interest (ROI) because it has been shown to be an im-
portant neural substrate in a diverse set of experiments that involve
the relationship between the individual and others. For example,
unfair treatment by others in the ultimatum game appears to trigger
insular activity (3), with higher activations corresponding to more
frequent rejection of the unfair offers (12). Inequality aversion
within different contextual situations has also been associated
with activation in the insula in other ultimatum-game scenarios
(14). Others have reported that individuals with personality dis-
orders exhibit dysfunction in the insula that is associated with
impaired trust and social cooperation (15). These and other
results suggest that the insular cortex in general is critical for the
perception of internal states (16), and that the anterior insula is
particularly important for awareness of our own feelings as they
relate to others (17), which may be especially relevant for em-
pathy in decision-making situations (18). Insula activation has
also been linked to volitional prosocial behavior induced by em-
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pathy toward other’s emotional or physical pain (19). Thus, we
expected that this brain region would be a likely candidate for
involvement in egalitarian behaviors.
Our neuroimaging results support the role of the insular cortex in
egalitarian behavior. Specifically, we identified a region within the
transition area of lateral inferior frontal gyrus and anterior insula
(Fig. 2), where activations correlated significantly with changes in
group equality when resulting incomes were shown at the end of
each trial. These activations were also significantly associated with
two additional measures of egalitarianism. First, the activations
correlated with a widely used index of self-reported egalitarianism
(Huber regression, P = 0.009) (Fig. 2, Top, Center). Second, the
activations were significantly associated with egalitarian behavior
measured by a series of dictator games (SI Methods) played after
the scan session (Huber regression, P = 0.05) (Fig. 2, Top, Right).
Discussion
To summarize, this experiment shows that some parts of the brain
are more active during egalitarian outcomes, and these activa-
tions are correlated with egalitarian behavior inside the scanner.
However, a more crucial result is that the activations are also
correlated with behavior outside the scanner, including self-
reported preferences for egalitarian outcomes and game behavior
that reveals how willing subjects are to use their own resources to
obtain egalitarian outcomes within their groups. Taken together,
the evidence suggests that the anterior insular cortex plays a crit-
ical role in egalitarian behavior in humans. This conclusion is
consistent with a broader view of the insular cortex as a neural
substrate (17) that processes the relationship of the individual
with respect to his or her environment (19). The predominately
left-lateralized activation may point toward the possibility of a
positive valence or energy-preserving mode- (17) related pro-
cessing during egalitarian behavior (i.e., individuals may see the
group as a greater good that is worth preserving). The fact that the
insula is directly involved in physiological, food, and pain-related
processing supports the general notion that prosocial behavior,
which is important for survival of both the individual and the
group/species, is implemented on a fundamental physiological
level similar to breathing, heartbeat, hunger, and pain.
Adam Smith (1) contended that moral sentiments like egali-
tarianism derived from a “fellow-feeling” that would increase with
our level of sympathy for others, predicting not merely aversion to
inequity, but also our propensity to engage in egalitarian behav-
iors. The evidence here supports such an interpretation. Although
individuals may experience internal rewards when punishing an-
tisocial behavior (6) and may have preferences for social equality
(8), our results suggest that it is the brain mechanisms involved in
experiencing the emotional and social states of self and others
(17–21) that appear to be driving egalitarian behaviors.
Our results have important implications for theories of the
evolution of prosocial behavior that suggest culturally transmitted
“levelingmechanisms”—for example, food sharingandmonogamy—
Fig. 1. Sample initial screenshot (Upper Left) shows own income at bottom and income of each other group member at top. During decision phases, income
beneath silhouette changes to reflect incomes that will result from the subject’s actions. The timeline for each trial (Lower Left) included an initial phase where
randomly drawn incomes for each group member were shown, three decision phases in which the subject sees a target group member’s income and then
chooses whether or not to give or take tokens from the target, and an outcome phase where resulting incomes for each group member are shown. To identify
ROIs, we regressed voxel activations on the convolution of six time-varying covariates with heights depending on initial own income, initial group equality,
target “richness” (target income minus mean group income among those who earn more than average), target “poorness” (mean group income minus target
income among those who earn less than average), change in one’s own income, and change in group equality. Consistent with previously published work (1),
scanner subjects tend to give tokens to low earners (Upper Right) and take away tokens from high earners (Lower Right). Vertical lines indicate SEMs.
6480 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1118653109 Dawes et al.
stifle within-group competition and create circumstances in which
intergroup antagonism generates selective pressure for altruistic
behaviors (22). A concern for equality may have originally evolved
because it fostered the conditions necessary for early human
groups to maintain a high level of cooperation (23). Future re-
search should focus on the interconnectivity of regions of the brain
involved in egalitarianism and altruism to better understand how
these two behaviors may have coevolved.
Methods
Stimulus/Task. To measure egalitarian behavior we use the random-income
game (5). In this game, subjects are divided into groups of four anonymous
members each. Each player receives a sum of monetary units (MUs) randomly
assigned by a computer and each MU equals US $0.05. To maximize differ-
ences in initial group inequality we created three kinds of groups: a purely
equal group (MUs for each group member = 20, 20, 20, and 20), a low-in-
equality group (MUs = 11, 17, 23, and 29), and a high-inequality group (MUs =
2, 14, 26, 38). Subjects are shown the payoffs of other groupmembers for that
Fig. 2. ROIs in the insular cortex where activations correlated significantly with change in group equality when resulting incomes were shown at the end of
each trial. Between subject activations in Insula ROI 1 predict a self-reported measure of egalitarianism (first row, Center). They also predict egalitarian
behavior as measured in a series of dictator games with different multipliers (first row, Right). Insula ROI 2 (second row) shows the same pattern, but the
relationships are not significant. Two ROIs in the vmPFC (third and fourth rows) show no relationship with egalitarianism measured outside the scanner. Lines
and P values based on Huber regression.
Dawes et al. PNAS | April 24, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 17 | 6481
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round and are then provided an opportunity to give up to 10 “negative
tokens” or “positive tokens” to other players. Each negative token costs 1MU
and decreases the payoff of a targeted individual by 3 MUs; positive tokens
also cost 1MU, but increase the targeted individual’s payoff by 3MUs. Groups
are randomized after each round to prevent reputation from influencing
decisions; interactions between players are strictly anonymous and subjects
know this. Furthermore, by allowing participants more than one behavioral
alternative, the experiment eliminates possible demand effects (24).
Subjects also completed a self-report survey that included a battery of
items, including a standard set of questions that measure egalitarian pref-
erences. At the conclusion of the study, subjects completed five rounds of the
modified dictator game (25).
Subjects. All subjects were undergraduate social science majors at the Uni-
versity of California at San Diego and provided informed consent. Based on
a pilot study, we chose individuals who bought more positive or negative
tokens in relatively unequal conditions of the random-income game to
complete an fMRI screening questionnaire. As a result, the subjects selected
tend to be more egalitarian than those in the overall pilot sample. Although
this selection process potentially makes the sample less representative over-
all, it increases the number of observations of egalitarian behavior and
therefore improves the power of statistical tests. Subjects who were deemed
eligible based on the screening questionnaire were invited to participate in
the neuroimaging phase of the experiment. The final fMRI sample consisted
of 10 males and 10 females that were all very similar in age.
Image Acquisition. fMRI data were collected at the University of California at
San Diego on a 3T GE CXK4 Magnet with an eight-channel brain array coil to
axially acquire T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPI) (field-of-view 230 mm,
64 × 64 matrix; 30 2.6-mm thick slices; 1.4 mm gap; TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 32 ms,
flip angle = 90°). The basic structural and functional image processing were
conducted with the Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software
package (26). All EPI images were aligned to the high-resolution anatomical
images and resampled to a voxel size of 4 × 4 × 4 mm (from the original 3.7 ×
3.7 × 4 mm). Data were temporally smoothed, spatially blurred with a 6-mm
FWHM spatial filter, and normalized to Talairach space (via AFNI’s auto
Talairach program, followed by visual inspection of each structural image).
Data Analysis. A regression model was constructed for a contrast against the
hypothesized voxel activation, based on a blood-oxygen level-dependent
hemodynamic response function with 4- to 6-s peaks (Fig. 1). The model is
composed of six time-varying convolved regressors with heights that vary
based on certain aspects of the trial (Fig. 1). The parameters of the model
were varied by round based on the different characteristics of each re-
spective trial of the random-income game. The coefficient for each regressor
was established using a standard general linear model.
The regression model consists of three parts that are designed to measure
activation during each phase of the trial:
Introduction phase regressors. An “own income” regressor was computed as the
initial incomeassigned to the subject by the computer, and a “group inequality”
regressor was calculated as the initial SD of all four incomes in the group.
Decision phase regressors. A “target richness” regressor was defined as the
target’s income minus the group average income for the trial. Negative
values for this regressor (where the target was poorer than average) were
assigned a 0. Similarly a “target poorness” variable was defined as the group
average income for the trial minus the target’s income. Negative values
(where the target was richer than average) were assigned a 0. These two
regressors index the degree to which, during decision-making, the target is
either doing better or worse than the group as a whole.
Outcome phase regressors. These regressors were used to indicate the change in
individual andgroup incomesduring the trial resulting from tokenpurchases by
all four group members. An “own income change” regressor measured the
subject’s final income minus his or her initial income, and a “group equality
change” regressor measured thefinal SD of group incomesminus the initial SD.
A statistical model was used to relate changes in EPI intensity to differences
in task characteristics (27). All slices of the EPI scans were temporally aligned
following registration to ensure that different relationships with the
regressors were not a result of the acquisition of different slices at different
times during the repetition interval. EPIs were coregistered using a 3D-cor-
egistration algorithm (28) that has been developed to minimize the amount
of image translation and rotation relative to all other images. Six motion
parameters were obtained for each subject. Three motion regressors (roll,
pitch, and yaw), a linear trend, and constant were included in the model.
Based on the fit to the regressors of interest, percent signal changes were
calculated on the spatial blurred (6-mm Gaussian blur) normalized brains.
Specifically, we used six convolved regressors, two for each phase of the task
(Fig. 1). A threshold adjustment method based on Monte-Carlo simulations
was applied to prevent identification of false-positive areas of activation
(29). Based on these simulations, it was determined that a voxel-wise a priori
probability of 0.01 (t = 2.552) would result in a corrected cluster-wise acti-
vation probability of 0.01 (one-sided) if a minimum volume 320 μL and a
connectivity radius of 4.0 mm were to be considered.
Following the individual analysis, we determined how differences in be-
havior across subjects were related to brain activation differences that are
indexed by coefficients on one of the six regressors. Specifically, we considered
the behavior during the 20 rounds × 3 group members (60 total) possible
decisions and computed two measures of egalitarian behavior: (i) a “take
from rich” measure equal to the Pearson correlation between “target rich-
ness” and the amount of the change in the target income resulting from the
subject’s purchases of positive and negative tokens; (ii) a “give to poor”
measure equal to the Pearson correlation between “target poorness” and
the amount of the change in the target income resulting from the subject’s
purchases of positive and negative tokens. To identify ROIs, these measures
were used in a multiple regression analysis with the behavior as the in-
dependent measures and the first level analysis as the dependent measure.
These results were analyzed in R (30) for group effects and correlations. Using
the “take from rich” measure, we identified four ROIs using “natomically
constrained functional regions of interest” (31). For the insular cortex we
constructed a probability mask. The probability mask was modeled after a
well-documented atlas of various neurological structures. Briefly, to extract
a mask for the insular cortex, we used Individual Brain Atlases using Statistical
Parametric Mapping software (32), a toolbox for segmenting structural MR
images. All programs in this toolbox are developed in MATLAB (33), based on
a widely used neuroimaging software package, SPM (Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging, London, United Kingdom). This package uses the nonlinear
registration and gray matter segmentation processes performed through
SPM5 subroutines. The group insula mask was obtained by averaging across
the individual insular masks and requiring that for the common insula mask
each voxel had to cover the insula gray matter in at least 50% of all subjects.
Second-Level Analysis. All second-level analyses were conducted using the
statistical programming language R (30) and with SPSS software, version 10.
Specifically, a mixed-model analysis was conducted with the R procedure
lme, which is part of the nlme library. The fixed effects were decision type,
the random effects were subjects. Moreover, we conducted voxel-wise
multiple linear regression analyses with performance during the task as in-
dependent measures, and the percent signal change during the different
decision-making phases as the dependent measure using the lm procedure
in R. Finally, we conducted a between-subjects analysis of activations in the
identified ROIs (as measured by coefficients on the regressors) and measures
of self-reported and behavioral egalitarianism outside the scanner using the
rlm procedure in R.
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SI Methods
The supplementary information includes: (i) details of behavioral
and attitudinal studies conducted inside and outside the scanner,
and (ii) complete instructions for both studies.
Study Details. Pilot study. In the “random-income” game player al-
locations are randomly drawn from the empirical distribution. Our
study had different distributions of allocations based or treatments
(T1–T3). In the three treatments allocations are shown to each
subject. Each subject was given an opportunity to increase or de-
crease the income of other subjects. Each subject could buy up to 10
“positive” tokens and up to 10 “negative” tokens for each of the
other players. Each negative token costs the subject one token and
reduces the target’s income by three tokens. Each positive token
costs the subject one token and increases the target’s incomeby three
tokens. One by one, each target’s income was highlighted and the
subject was asked if he or she wanted to buy tokens. After subjects
make their decisions, they saw the results (unless in an intersession
group, see below) and then proceeded to the next treatment.
The distribution of allocations were symmetric and varied in
the degree of inequality as follows: T1= (20, 20, 20, 20), T2= (11,
17, 23, 29), and T3= (2, 14, 26, 38). In particular, T1 is the perfect
equality condition, and served a contrast for the other conditions
that exhibit increasing degrees of inequality. Subjects were ran-
domly assigned incomes such that they were the low, middle-low,
middle-high, or high earner at different points during the study.
We ran two types of random income games. In the first type,
subjects were matched with three subjects from the same session
(S) and in the second type subjects were matched with three
subjects from other sessions (O). The purpose of the latter-type
groups was to be able to match subject responses to subjects who
are chosen for the second functional MRI (fMRI) phase of the
study. Each subject participated in both types of groups. Subjects
were paid for their decisions in S rounds of the random-income
treatments following the conclusion of the session because we
had complete information about all player choices at that time.
For O rounds, they were paid immediately following the fMRI
portion of the study.
Theorderof group typeswas randomlydetermined toprevent the
group typeand timeofpayment from influencing subject choices.At
the conclusion of the punishment and reward stage for each treat-
ment inwhich thesubjecthasbeenplaced ina sametypeS treatment,
subjects saw their fellowplayers’decisions and the total income they
earned for that treatment. At the conclusion of the punishment and
reward stage for each treatment in which the subject was placed in a
type O treatment, subjects received a message stating that their
decisions for that treatmentwill bematchedwith a player in another
session and they will be paid at a later time. Subjects did not know
at the time of their initial decision which type of round they were in
or how many type S and O rounds they would play in total.
In total, each subject played 3 rounds of type S and 18 rounds of
type O random-income games. We ran six sessions of the random-
income game with a total of 140 subjects.
Subject selection for fMRI study. After the conclusion of the pilot
study we chose subjects from the pilot who bought more positive
or negative tokens in relatively unequal conditions to complete an
fMRI screening questionnaire. Those who were deemed eligible
were invited to participate in the neuroimaging phase of the
experiment. The final fMRI sample consisted of 10 males and 10
females that were all very similar in age.
Study payment.Pilot subjects were paid a show-up fee of $10. These
subjects were paid for all of their S rounds at the conclusion of
each session and were paid at the conclusion of the study for the
O rounds. The fMRI subjects were paid a show-up fee of $50 and
were then paid for their actions in the game at the conclusion of
the study.
Dictator game.Atthetimeoffinalpayment subjectswereaskedtoplay
five rounds of the modified dictator game (1). The dictator game
involves two “players.” The first player determines a split of some
endowment between herself and the other player. In our case,
subjects were asked to split 10 lottery tickets between themselves
and an anonymous study recipient. The second player simply re-
ceives the number of tickets the first player has allocated to her and
thushas no strategic role in the game. If thefirst individualwere only
concerned with her own well-being, she would keep all of the tickets
and pass nothing. Therefore, any positive allocation to the second
player is viewed as a revealed-preference measure of altruism.
The modified dictator game (2) enables researchers to distin-
guish between egalitarian and altruist preference types. Egali-
tarians prefer to equalize the payoffs to both players in each of the
dictator games, whereas altruists simply maximize the amount
they give away. In the modified dictator game subjects are asked
to play several dictator games in which the price of passing some
of the endowment to the other player varies. In our experiment
there were five conditions: each ticket kept would yield one
chance in lottery for the player originally given the endowment
and each ticket passed would yield one chance for the other
player (1:1); each ticket kept would yield one chance and each
passed would yield two chances (1:2); each ticket kept would yield
one chance and each passed would yield three chances (1:3); each
ticket kept would yield two chances and each passed would yield
one chance (2:1); each ticket kept would yield three chances and
each passed would yield one chance (3:1). Egalitarians prefer to
equalize the payoffs to both players in each of the dictator games,
therefore they should pass 5 tickets in the 1:1 condition, 3.33
tickets in the 1:2 condition, 2.5 tickets in the 1:3 condition, 6.67
tickets in the 2:1 condition, and 7.5 tickets in the 3:1 condition.
Tickets were not divisible but the degree to which subjects ex-
hibited egalitarian preferences were determined by how closely
they matched this ideal type. Specifically, our measure of egali-
tarian behavior is equal to the negative of the sum of the square
difference in each game between the number of tickets given away
and the number an egalitarian would give away.
Subjects were informed that their participation made them
eligible to win $100. They were told that a winner would be drawn
randomly and that the number of times an individual’s name was
entered in the draw depended on allocations in the dictator game.
Self-reported egalitarianism. We administered to subjects six ques-
tions that have been asked repeatedly in the National Election
Studies since 1984 (3) to measure self-reported egalitarianism.
Each question included response options of Strong Agree, Agree
Somewhat, Neither, Disagree Somewhat, Strongly Disagree.
These questions included:
Q1: Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure
that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.
Q2: We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
Q3: One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t
give everyone an equal chance.
Q4: This country would be better off if we worried less about
how equal people are.
Q5: It is not really that big a problem if some people have
more of a chance in life than others.
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Q6: If people were treated more equally in this country we
would have many fewer problems.
A factor analysis showed that these questions all load on the
same factor with a Cronbach’s α = 0.88. The factor from this
analysis is treated as the egalitarianism index, with positive val-
ues indicating greater self-assessment of egalitarianism. This
measure is significantly correlated with the dictator game mea-
sure of egalitarianism (Pearson’s correlation 0.69, 95% confi-
dence interval 0.23–0.85).
Study Instructions. Random-income game subject instructions. You are
now taking part in an economic experiment, which has been fi-
nanced by various foundations for research. If you read the
following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your
decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore
very important that you read these instructions carefully.
The instructions, which we have distributed to you, are solely
for your private information. It is prohibited to communicate with
the other participants during the experiment. Should you have any
questions please ask us.
During the experiment we will not speak of Dollars but rather
of tokens. During the experiment your entire earnings will be
calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment the total
amount of tokens you have earned will be converted to Dollars at
the following rate:
1 token ¼ 5 cents:
Theexperiment is divided intoperiods. In total, theexperiment has
21 periods. In each period the participants are divided into groups
of four. That is, your group has three other participants in it aside
from you. Group composition will change in each period. In each
of the 21 periods your group of four is composed of different
people. Therefore, in each of the 21 periods you will form a group
with three different people. For some of the 21 periods your group
will be made up of participants from other sessions.
First Stage
At the beginning of each period the computer will randomly
choose a number of tokens to give to each person in your group.
The incomeof each groupmember from theproject is calculated in
the same way. An income screen will show you how many tokens
you and each member of your group have earned at the first stage.
After the first stage concludes, we will begin the second stage.
Do you have any questions?
Second stage
You will see how much the individual group members have
earned in the first stage. Please note that who is in your group is
randomly determined in each period; the individuals in your
group are likely to change over the course of the experiment.
Youwill now have the opportunity to change or leave unchanged
the income of each of the other group members. You can either
decrease their income by allocating negative tokens or you can
increase their incomebyallocatingpositive tokens.Theother group
members can also reduce or increase your income, if they so wish.
You must decide how many negative or positive tokens to give
to each of the other three group members and then move the
slider to either the left to give negative tokens or to the right to
give positive tokens. If you do not want to change the income of a
particular group member, simply do not move the slider. Once
you have made a decision regarding a member of your group, hit
the Allocate button to move to the next group member.
If you distribute negative tokens, youmust pay a cost for each of
the negative tokens you allocate. Negative tokens are integers
between 0 and 10. The more negative tokens you allocate, the
higher your costs. The following formula indicates how much it
costs to allocate negative tokens:
Cost of negative tokens ¼ Sum of allocated negative tokens:
Each negative token therefore costs you 1 token. If, for instance,
you allocate 2 negative tokens to one group member, you must
pay a cost of 2 tokens. If you allocate 9 negative tokens to another
member, it will cost you an additional 9 tokens; if you allocate
0 negative tokens to the last group member, there will be no
additional cost. Therefore, you have allocated a total of 11
negative tokens and your total costs are 11 tokens (2+9+0).
Each negative token you allocate to a groupmember reduces his
or her incomeby 3 tokens. If youallocate 0 tokens to a certain group
member, you do not change the income of this group member. If,
however, you allocate one negative token to a group member, you
reduce his or her income by 3 tokens. If you allocate 2 negative
tokens toagroupmember, youreducehisorher incomeby6 tokens.
If you distribute positive tokens, you must pay a cost for each of
the positive tokens you allocate. Positive tokens are integers
between 0 and 10. The more positive tokens you allocate, the
higher your costs. The following formula indicates how much it
costs to allocate positive tokens:
Cost of positive tokens ¼ Sum of positive tokens:
Each positive token therefore costs you 1 token. If, for instance,
you allocate 2 positive tokens to one group member, you must
pay a cost of 2 tokens. If you allocate 9 positive tokens to another
member, it will cost you an additional 9 tokens; if you allocate
0 positive tokens to the last group member, there will be no
additional cost. Therefore, you have allocated a total of 11
positive tokens and your total costs are 11 tokens (2+9+0).
Each positive token you allocate to a group member increases
his or her income by 3 tokens. If you allocate 0 positive tokens to a
certain group member, you do not change the income of this
group member. If, however, you allocate one positive token to a
group member, you increase his or her income by 3 tokens. If you
allocate 2 positive tokens to a group member, you increase his or
her income by 6 tokens.
Whether or by howmuch the income at the end of the period is in
total increased or decreased depends on the total of the received
positive or negative tokens. If somebody receives a total of 3
negative tokens (from all other groupmembers in this period), then
his or her income would be decreased by 9 tokens. If somebody
receives a total of 4 negative tokens, his or her income is reduced by
12 tokens. Likewise, if somebody receives a total of 3 positive tokens
(from all other group members in this period), then his or her in-
comewouldbe increasedby9 tokens. If somebody receivesa total of
4 positive tokens, his or her income is increased by 12 tokens. Your
total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows:
Total incomeðin tokensÞat the end of the period ¼ period income
¼ income from first stage ð1Þ
− 3*ðsum of received negative tokensÞð2Þ
þ3*ðsum of received positive tokensÞð3Þ
− costs of your negative tokens allocated to othersð4Þ
− costs of your positive tokens allocated to othersð5Þ
if ð1Þ þ ð2Þ þ ð3Þ þ ð4Þ þ ð5Þ≥0;
¼ 0− costs of your distributed tokens
if ð1Þ þ ð2Þ< 0
Please note that your income in tokens at the end of the period
can be negative, if the costs of your distributed (negative or
positive) tokens exceed your income in tokens minus the cost of
received negative tokens plus the cost of received positive tokens.
You can, however, avoid such losses with certainty through your
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own decisions! After all participants have made their decision,
your income from the period will be displayed on the screen.
Do you have further questions?
Modified dictator game instructions. (Subjects read the following
instructions)
At the conclusion of this study we will award a $100 prize. You
have received a set of envelopes from the study supervisor. Five
WHITE envelopes have tickets in them. One BROWN envelope
has no tickets in it. Each ticket gives between 1 and 3 chances to
win the $100 prize. At the end of the study, we will complete
a draw. With each chance you have to win the prize, your name
will be entered into the draw once. We will notify all participants
of the winner’s name by e-mail.
Some of the tickets we give you have a higher chance of winning
the prize.
A REGULAR TICKET has 1 chance of winning the prize.
A DOUBLE TICKET has 2 chances of winning the prize.
A TRIPLE TICKET has 3 chances of winning the prize.
This means a DOUBLE TICKET is twice as likely to win as
a REGULAR TICKET and a TRIPLE TICKET is three times as
likely to win as a REGULAR TICKET.
Your name will be entered into the draw the same number of
times if you hold 1 TRIPLE TICKET or 3 REGULAR TICKETS.
When you have completed all five questions, please return all
envelopes to the study administrator. Another person will later
count the tickets and assign you the appropriate number of
chances to win the prize.
(Subjects were then handed one page of instructions for each
envelope, labeled B, R, O, W, and G. The order of pages was
randomly determined).
[B; R; O; W; G] Envelopes: Please read these instructions carefully. Find
the white envelope marked with the letter “[B; R; O; W; G].” This
envelope has 10 prize tickets in it. Youmay keep all of the tickets in
this envelope, or you can place some or all of them in the brown
envelope. Tickets placed in the brown envelope will give chances to
win to a randomly chosen anonymous individual. You will never be
able to find out the identity of the anonymous individual, and the
anonymous individual will never be able to find out your identity.
Youmust choosehowtodivide the10 ticketsbetweenyourselfand
the anonymous individual. You may keep all, none, or some of the
tickets—the decision is up to you andwill be completely anonymous.
Each ticket you keep will be a [REGULAR; REGULAR;
REGULAR; DOUBLE; TRIPLE] ticket, giving you [1; 1; 1; 2; 3]
chance(s) to win the prize
Each ticket you give away will be a [REGULAR; DOUBLE;
TRIPLE; REGULAR; REGULAR] ticket, giving the anony-
mous individual [1; 2; 3; 1; 1] chance(s) to win the prize.
If you choose to share some tickets, take that number of tickets
out of the “[B; R; O; W; G]” envelope and put them in the brown
envelope. Seal the envelopes and set them aside.
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